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Bowen v. Amoco: 1 Contracting for Expanded Judicial
Review under the Federal Arbitration Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is generally defined as "[a] process of dispute
resolution in which a neutral third party (arbitrator) renders a decision
after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be
heard."2 Arbitration is intended to yield benefits for both the parties
to the dispute and the court. For parties, arbitration is generally less
expensive, quicker, less formal, and more private than a trial.3 In
addition, parties contracting for arbitration have virtually unlimited
control over the arbitration process. For instance, they may select the
arbitrator(s) who will decide their dispute,4 and may even create their
own discovery process and procedural devices.5 Courts benefit from
arbitration by saving time and expense that would otherwise be spent
litigating those disputes.6 This is true of federal courts under the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)7 because all disputes pursuant to the
FAA must have independent grounds for subject matterjurisdiction s
Thus, disputes that are not arbitrated under the FAA would likely be
litigated in the federal district courts,9 placing an additional strain on
court resources.
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1. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
2. Black's Law Dictionary 70 (abridged 6th ed. 1991).
3. Tom Cullinan, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review in
Arbitration Agreements, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 396-97(1998).
4. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1999).
5. Cullinan, supra note 3, at 397.
6. Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, CommercialArbitration in Evolution:
An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 343, 345
(1995) (citations omitted).
7. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1999). The Federal Arbitration Act is the act under
which the Bowen dispute arose. This note only discusses voluntary arbitration
agreements in which parties agree to expanded review under the FAA. Other
related issues concerning consumer arbitration agreements, compulsory
(involuntary) arbitration, and the extent to which parties can agree to lesser or no
review, are beyond the scope of this paper.
8. The FAA does not create an independent source of federal jurisdiction. See
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32, 103
S.Ct. 927, 942 n.32 (1983).
9. Of course, parties may also choose to litigate their disputes in state courts
in the absence of an arbitration agreement. But regardless of whether the parties
choose federal or state courts to litigate, in the absence of an arbitration agreement
those courts will be burdened by the time and expense to adjudicate the dispute.
However, this paper will assume that the parties would litigate in federal court for
the sake of simplicity.
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In light of these benefits, it is not surprising that commercial
arbitration is becoming more popular.' ° Recently however, many
parties to arbitration have become frustrated with the outcome of
arbitrators' decisions." As one scholar has commented, "[i]n
several conspicuous, high stakes disputes and untold lower profile
arbitrations, arbitrators have rendered decisions that have fallen
well outside the reasonable expectations of the parties."' 2 The
primary problem for parties who have experienced or are concerned
about such aberrant awards is the FAA's extremely high standards
for review. These narrow standards are set out in Title 9, Section
10(a) of the United States Code which provides:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and
for the district wherein the award was made may make an
order vacating the award upon the application of any party
to the arbitration-
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which
the agreement required the award to be made has not expired
the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators. 1
3
As if these standards to vacate arbitration awards are not high
enough, the FAA does not require arbitrators to render written
opinions, 14 which further raises the bar for federal district judges to
correct anomalous awards. When there is no written opinion, as is
10. Hayford & Peeples, supra note 6, at 347.
11. See Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial
Review ofArbitration Awards, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 241 (1999) ("In recent years there
has been a growing concern over the 'Russian Roulette' nature of arbitration.").
12. Id.
13. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a) (1999).
14. See United Steelworkers ofArn. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361 (1960).
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often the case,'" it is quite a challenge for a judge to decide whether
the FAA's standards have been violated.
As a result, many parties have attempted to contractually expand
the extremely limited FAA standards of judicial review in order to
avoid unfair results.' 6 Parties who purport to expand this standard
usually do so by providing in their arbitration contract that the
arbitration award may be vacated on the basis of errors of law and/or
fact.' 7 In addition, more and more parties may consider rejecting
arbitration in favor of adjudication for fear of aberrant awards."8
Thus far, several federal cases have addressed whether parties
may contractually agree to expand the judicial standards of review
under the FAA. While the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that
agreements to expand judicial review in arbitration proceedings are
permitted,'9 the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have suggested in dicta
that they would not enforce such contracts.20 Recently, in Bowen v.
Amoco, the Tenth Circuit held that parties may not contractually
expand the FAA's standards of review,2 thus creating a definitive
split among the federal circuits.
As this note will demonstrate, parties should be able to
contractually expand the scope ofjudicial review set out in the FAA,
subject to only a few practical limitations. Arbitration is essentially
a contractual arrangement of dispute resolution that should bp
honored according to the terms agreed upon by the parties.
Contractually expanded review is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent and FAA policy. Moreover, allowing expanded review
under the FAA benefits the parties to the dispute, as well as the
federal judiciary and the legal system as a whole.
15. Hayford & Peeples, supra note 6, at 360 (describing the practice of
supplying no written opinion as "the prevailing practice").
16. See infra Part II(B)(2).
17. For examples of different language in clauses that have attempted to expand
judicial review in various reported cases, see infra Part II(B)(2).
18. Younger, supra note 11, at 248 ("[T]he mere possibility of arbitrator excess
has undermined the viability of arbitration in the eyes of some.") (citing Ilan E.
Simon, Note, Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Associates, Inc.: The
Eradication of the Mistake of Law Doctrine in Private Sector Arbitration, 48
Rutgers L. Rev. 533, 571 (1996), Ronald M. Sturtz, The Debate Heats Up Over
Judicial Review ofArbitration Results, N.J.L.J., Aug. 12, 1996, at S-6).
19. Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir.
1995); Lapine Techn. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997). See
also Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir. 1997)
(unpublished), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110, 118 S.Ct. 1039 (1998), and New
England Util. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp.2d 53 (D. Mass. 1998) for agreement.
20. Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501
(7th Cir. 1991); UHC Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992(8th Cir. 1998).
21. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 937.
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Part II of this note discusses the legal background surrounding
this issue, including a discussion of the FAA's general purpose and
cases leading up to Bowen. Part IM is a brief statement of the Bowen
case, while Part IV analyzes the Tenth Circuit's reasoning and
provides practical limitations concerning the extent to which
expanded review should be permitted. Finally, Part V concludes that
parties should be allowed to contractually expand the scope of
judicial review beyond that provided for in the FAA.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The FAA's Primary Purpose
It is well settled that "Congress's intent in enacting the FAA was
to ensure judicial enforcement of private arbitration agreements."22
Although arbitration derived from English common law, early
American courts often refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate
future disputes.23 While purporting to enforce arbitration awards
already rendered, courts would implement virtually unlimitedjudicial
review and often vacated arbitrational awards.24 This practice
frustrated the intentions of parties who wished their arbitration award
to be final.25
In response to American courts' hostility to honor arbitration
agreements, Congress enacted the FAA in 1925.26 The FAA was
22. Id. at 933 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Leahman Hutton, Inc., 514
U.S. 52, 57, 115 S.Ct. 1212, 1216 (1995); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of
Trustees, 489 U.S. 468,479, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1256 (1989); Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,219-20, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1242 (1985) (internal citations
omitted)). See supra note 23.
23. Cullinan, supra note 3, at408-09, and 410 n.98. The House Report forthe
FAA stated:
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American
law .... (B)ecause of the jealousy of the English courts for their
own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to
arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from
their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that
the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law
and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have
felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned
without legislative enactment, although they have frequently
criticized the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the
injustice which results from it. The bill declares simply that such
agreements for arbitration shall be enforced ....
H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924).
24. Cullinan, supra note 3, at 409.
25. Id. at 409-12.
26. Id.at410.
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designed to make executory agreements to arbitrate legally
enforceable." Limited judicial review was codified in order to assure
the finality of arbitration awards, as finality was important to most, if
not all, parties to arbitration agreements in that era.28 Against this
backdrop, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has articulated
the FAA's primary purpose as one "of ensuring that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms. 29
B. Cases Leading up to Bowen
First, a brief summary of the Supreme Court's decision in Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University0 will be presented. This decision has been central
to the issue of expanded judicial review, and has been discussed by
many courts, including the Tenth Circuit in Bowen, who have
wrestled with this issue. Second, a general discussion of pre-Bowen
cases on point will be presented for two purposes: to provide
examples of contractual language purporting to expand arbitrational
judicial review; and to introduce the major arguments made by
previous courts on this issue.
1. The Volt Decision
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees ofLeland
Stanford Junior University,3 the parties entered into a construction
contract that contained an agreement to arbitrate all disputes between
the parties arising out of the contract.32 The contract also contained
a choice-of-law provision providing that the contract would be
governed by the law of California." After a dispute arose concerning
the contract, Volt Information Systems (Volt) formally demanded
arbitration.34 The Board of Trustees (Stanford) responded by filing
actions in California Superior Court against Volt and two other
companies involved in the construction project.35 Volt moved to
compel arbitration pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA36 and a parallel
27. Id.at410-11.
28. Id. at410-12.
29. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. ofTrustees ofLeland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 478-79, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1255-56 (1989).
30. 489 U.S. 468, 109 S:Ct.1248 (1989).
31. Id., 109 S.Ct. at 1248.
32. Id. at 470, 109 S.Ct. at 1251.
33. Id., 109 S.Ct. at 1251.
34. Id., 109 S.Ct. at 1251.
35. Id. at470-71, 109 S.Ct. at 1251.
36. 9 U.S.C. § 4 provides in pertinent part: "A party aggrieved by the alleged
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provision of the California Arbitration Act.37 The court refused to
compel arbitration, and instead granted Stanford's motion to stay
arbitration pursuant to a California statute that "permits a court to stay
arbitration pending resolution of related litigation between a party to the
arbitration agreement and third parties not bound by it, where 'there is a
possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact." 3
The California Court of Appeal affirmed,39 and the California Supreme
Court denied Volt's petition for discretionary review.' The United
States Supreme Court granted writs.
The United States Supreme Court dismissed Volt's contention that
the California Court of Appeal's decision essentially found that Volt had
waived its right to compel arbitration under the FAA.4' While
recognizing that the FAA was designed to place arbitration agreements
"upon the same footing as other contracts," ' 2 the Court found that
Section 4 of the FAA did not grant a right to compel arbitration at any
time, but instead grants only "the right to obtain an order directing that
'arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties 'I
agreement.""'3 After noting that the interpretation of private contracts is
usually a question of state law,' the Court held that the California Court
of Appeal found that the parties had agreed that arbitration would only
proceed in situations which fell within the scope of the California
statute.45 Hence, while not waiving their right to compel arbitration, the
parties agreed not to proceed with arbitration until related pending
litigation was resolved.
The Supreme Court also rejected Volt's contention that the
California Court of Appeal's holding would violate FAA policy of
favoring arbitration.47 Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that
such a policy exists, the Court stated, "[t]here is no federal policy
favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal
policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of
private agreements to arbitrate." ' The Court also noted that agreeing to
failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for
arbitration may petition any United States district court ... for an order directing
that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement."
37. Volt, 489 U.S. at 470-71 n.2, 109 S.Ct. at 1251 n.2.
38. Id. at 471, 109 S.Ct. at 1251.
39. Id., 109 S.Ct. at 1252.
40. Id. at 472-73, 109 S.Ct. at 1252.
41. Id. at 474, 109 S.Ct. at 1253.
42. Id., 109 S.Ct. at 1253.
43. Volt, 489 U.S. at 474-75, 109 S.Ct. at 1253 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
44. Id. at 474, 109 S.Ct. at 1253.
45. Id. at 475, 109 S.Ct. at 1253.
46. Id., 109 S.Ct. at 1253.
47. Id. at 475-76, 109 S.Ct. at 1253-54.
48. Id. at 476, 109 S.Ct. at 1254.
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state rules of arbitration that are "manifestly designed to encourage resort
to the arbitral process" did not offend any FAA policy.
49
Finally, the Court addressed whether the California statute agreed
to was pre-empted by the FAA.50  After noting that the FAA
contained no express pre-emptive provision nor an intent to occupy
the field, the Court turned to whether the agreement at hand would
violate FAA policy.5  The Court held that it would not, and thus the
agreement was not pre-empted:
In recognition of Congress' principal purpose of ensuring that
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
terms, we have held that the FAA pre-empts state laws which
"require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which
the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."
(citations omitted). But it does not follow that the FAA
prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under
different rules than those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed,
such a result would be quite inimical to the FAA's primary
purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are
enforced according to their terms. Arbitration under the Act
is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally
free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.
Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will
arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under
which that arbitration will be conducted.52
2. Cases Permitting Contractual Expansion of Judicial
Review 3
In re Fils et Cables D 'Acier de Lens (FICAL) v. Midland Metals
Corp.54 was the first reported federal case to determine whether
parties may contractually expand judicial review. In two written
contracts for the sale of galvanized wire, the parties in FICAL agreed
that "the court shall have the power to review (1) whether the findings
49. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476, 109 S.Ct. at 1254.
50. Id. at 476-79, 109 S.Ct. at 1254-55.
51. Id. at 477-78, 109 S.Ct. at 1254-55.
52. Id. at 478-79, 109 S.Ct. at 1255-56 (citations omitted).
53. For purposes of brevity, the following less significant cases that have
permitted parties to expand arbitrational judicial review will not be discussed here:
Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished
opinion); New England Util. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D. Mass. 1998).
Hence, proponents ofcontractual expanded judicial review find support in the Third
and Fourth Circuits as well as in the cases in the following discussion.
54. 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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of fact rendered by the arbitrator are... supported by substantial
evidence, and (2) whether as a matter of law based on said findings
of fact the award should be affirmed, modified, or vacated."'5 After
a dispute arose concerning the quality of the galvanized wire, the
parties arbitrated the issue, and the arbitration panel granted an
award.56 Midland then contested the award pursuant to the arbitration
agreement."
In holding that the parties may contractually expand judicial
review in arbitration proceedings, the FICAL court first noted that
arbitration is a "creature of contract,"58 and "wholly dependent upon
agreement."59  Hence, according to the court, "there appears no
reason, absent ajurisdictional or public policy barrier, why the parties
cannot agree to alter the standard roles."'  The court reasoned that
there was no jurisdictional barrier to allowing such agreements since
all disputes under the FAA must have independent statutory subject
matterjurisdiction. 6' Nor, according to the court, did a public policy
barrier exist. While admitting that such agreements "take away much
of the efficiency incentive for resort to arbitration," the court agreed
that those contracts reduce the burden courts otherwise would have
to bear absent arbitration.62
The first federal appellate court to address this issue squarely was
the Fifth Circuit in Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp.63 In Gateway, the parties entered into a
contract containing an arbitration clause that provided that "errors of
law shall be subject to appeal."'  After an arbitrator awarded
damages to Gateway concerning a dispute as to the above-mentioned
contract, MCI filed a motion to vacate the award pursuant to the
expanded review provision.65
The Gateway court stated its holding in strong terms: "When, as
here, the parties agree contractually to subject an arbitration award to
expanded judicial review, federal arbitration policy demands that the
court conduct its review according to the terms of the arbitration
contract., 66 The first pillar of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning was FAA
55. Id. at 242.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 243.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 244.
60. FICAL, 584 F. Supp. at 244.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
64. Id. at 996.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 997.
NOTES
policy. The court relied heavily upon the following quote from
Volt:67 "There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain
set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to
arbitrate."6"
Contractual freedom was the second pillar of the Fifth Circuit's
opinion. The Gateway court rejected the district court's reasoning
that "the parties have sacrificed the simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration on the altar of appellate review" by finding
that "[p]rudent or not, the contract expressly and unambiguously
provides for review of 'errors of law;' to interpret this phrase short
of de novo review would render the language meaningless and would
frustrate the mutual intent of the parties. '
The Fifth Circuit gained support from the Ninth Circuit in Lapine
Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.7" In Lapine, the parties agreed
that "[t]he Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) based
upon any of the grounds referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii)
where the arbitrators' findings of fact are not supported by substantial
evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrators' conclusions of law are
erroneous."'" After a dispute relating to the contract was arbitrated
and a decision was rendered by an arbitration panel, Kyocera moved
to vacate the award in accordance with the expanded review clause.72
In holding that the court must honor the parties' agreement, the
Lapine court, like the Fifth Circuit in Gateway, relied upon language
in Volt73 for the proposition that "the primary purpose of the FAA is
to ensure enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate, in
accordance with the agreement's terms."74 The Lapine court also
relied on both FICAL and Gateway as persuasive authority.75
3. Cases Opposing Contractual Expansion of Judicial Review
While Bowen is the first federal appellate court to definitively
hold that parties may not contractually alter the judicial standard of
review in arbitration proceedings, two other circuits have stated in
67. 489 U.S. 468, 109 S.Ct. 1248 (1989).
68. Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997 n.3 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479, 109 S.Ct. at
1256).
69. Id. at 997.
70. 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
71. Id. at 887.
72. Id.
73. See supra note 52 and accompanying text for the language from Volt that
the Lapine court relied upon.
74. Lapine, 130 F.3d at 888.
75. Id. at 888-89.
2003]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
dicta that they too would prohibit such agreements.76 Although these
cases are not binding authority, a brief introduction to them is
worthwhile as they are cited by Bowen as persuasive authority."'
In 1991, the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Typographical Union v.
Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.78 stated in dictum that while "[parties] can
contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's
award... they cannot contract for judicial review of that award;
federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract. 79 However, as at
least two scholars have recently noted,8" Chicago Typographical
Union did not involve the FAA, but rather arose under Section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act.81' 82 This statute, unlike the FAA, creates an
independent source of federal jurisdiction. 3 Despite this arguably
distinguishing feature, the Tenth Circuit in Bowen cited Chicago
Typographical Uinion as persuasive authority for the proposition that
contractually expanded review is prohibited under the FAA.
8 4
In 1998, the Eighth Circuit in UHC Management Company, Inc.
v. Computer Sciences Corp.85 stated that, notwithstanding FICAL,
Gateway, and Lapine, "we do not believe it is yet a foregone
conclusion that parties may effectively agree to compel a federal court
to cast aside Sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA. 6 Explicitly stating
that it would not reach a decision on the matter until the issue was
properly before the court,87 the court displayed its contempt for
contractually expanding judicial review by emphasizing the plain
language of Section 9 of the FAA,8 the Lapine dissent, and a quote
in Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc.9°' 9
76. Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501
(7th Cir. 1991); UHC Mgrnt, Co., Inc. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992
(8th Cir. 1998).
77. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936-37.
78. 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
79. Id. at 1505.
80. Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 Am. Rev. Int'l
Arb. 225, 229 n.18 (1997); Cullinan, supra note 3, at 406 n.74.
81. Chicago Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1503.
82. The Taft Hartley Act is found in 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994). See also Rau, supra note 80, at 229 n.18;
Cullinan, supra note 3, at 406 n.74.
84. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936-37.
85. 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
86. Id. at 997.
87. Id. at 998.
88. Id. at 997.
89. Id. at 997-98.
90. Id. at 998 (quoting Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d
743, 751 n. 12 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that "where arbitration is contemplated the
courts are not equipped to provide the same judicial review given to structured
judgments defined by procedural rules and legal principles. Parties should be aware
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NOTES
III. BOWEN v. AMOCO: STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1918, the predecessors in interest to both the Bowen family and
Amoco Pipeline Co. ("Amoco") entered into a right-of-way
agreement containing an arbitration provision.92 The arbitration
agreement contained a clause allowing either party to appeal any
arbitration award to the district court within thirty days "on the
grounds that the award is not supported by the evidence. ' ' 3 In 1998,
Mr. and Mrs. Bowen filed a suit in federal district court against
Amoco for damages to their land allegedly caused by a leak in
Amoco's pipeline."4 Amoco moved to order the dispute to arbitration
pursuant to the aforementioned agreement, and the district court
granted Amoco's motion.9
In 1999, a panel of three arbitrators heard the case and granted
relief to the Bowens.96 The Bowens then filed a motion for
confirmation of the arbitration award in district court pursuant to
Section 9 of the FAA. Amoco objected and filed a motion to vacate
the award. Amoco also filed a notice of appeal of the arbitration
award in accordance with the modified arbitration rules.97
The district court refused to apply the parties' expanded judicial
standard of review and declined to vacate the award.98 The district
court also granted the Bowens' motion to confirm the award. Amoco
then appealed the district court's ruling.99
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that "parties may not contract
for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards."' Basically, the
court reasoned that "the purposes behind the FAA, as well as the
principles announced in various Supreme Court Cases, do not support
a rule allowing parties to alter the judicial process by private
that they get what they bargain for and that arbitration is different from
adjudication.")).
91. For other cases supporting the position of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits,
see Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Tex. 1997), and Konicki
v. Oak Brook Racquet Club, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1333 (Ill. App. 2nd Dist. 1982)
("Since a claimed 'gross abuse of discretion' is not a ground for review under
Sections 12 and 13 of the UAA, Konicki's petition failed to state a claim for relief
on that theory." Konicki, 441 N.E.2d at 1338.).
92. This agreement was ratified in 1943 by a second agreement. Bowen, 254
F.3d at 928 n. 1.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 928.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 930.
97. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 937.
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contract."' 1 The specifics of the court's reasoning are set forth in the
following paragraphs.
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by criticizing the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits' interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, primarily
the Volt case. The court stated, "Although the Court has emphasized
that parties may 'specify by contract the rules under which...
arbitration will be conducted,' it has never said parties are free to
interfere with the judicial process."102 In other words, the court
found that "no authority clearly allows private parties to determine
how federal courts review arbitration awards."
'103
The Tenth Circuit purported to further distinguish Volt.
According to the court, Volt held that parties may agree to non-FAA
procedural rules to govern arbitration only to the extent that allowing
such an agreement would not "[do] violence" to FAA policy."°
Stating that the FAA's "limited standards manifest a legislative
intent to further the federal policy favoring arbitration by preserving
the independence of the arbitration process," the Tenth Circuit held
that allowing expanded judicial review "does violence" to that FAA
policy, thereby violating the Volt decision.'05
The Tenth Circuit also looked to the language of the FAA in
distinguishing its decision from Volt. "Unlike [Section] 4 of the
FAA, which allows parties to petition a federal court for an order
compelling arbitration 'in the manner provided for in [the]
agreement,' the provisions governing judicial review of awards,
[Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA] contain no language requiring
district courts to follow parties' agreements."106
The remainder of the Tenth Circuit's analysis concerned a
variety of practical aspects of this issue. First, the court stated that
parties have an alternative to expanded judicial review; the
arbitration provision can provide for an appellate arbitration panel
to settle disputes regarding the arbitrator's award. 07 Second, while
noting that "even under expanded standards of review, arbitration
reduces the burden on district courts,' ' 08 the Tenth Circuit stated that
"expanded judicial review places federal courts in the awkward
101. Id. at 933.
102. Id. at 934 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479, 109 S.Ct. at 1248 (citation
omitted)).
103. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 (citing the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Lapine, 130 F.3d at 891).
104. Id. at 934-35 (citing Volt, 478 U.S at 479, 109 S.Ct. at 1248).
105. Id. at 935.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 934. See also Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times,
Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991).
108. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 n.6.
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position of reviewing proceedings conducted under potentially
unfamiliar rules and procedures."' Finally, the court asserted that
expanded judicial review would "reduce arbitrators' willingness to
create particularized solutions for fear the decision will be vacated
by a reviewing court.''' 0 I I I
IV. ANALYSIS
Contrary to the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, FAA policy and Volt
do support the allowing of parties to contractually expand judicial
review. For the sake of a simple comparison, the analysis below will
approach the issues in the same order that the court decided them.
Accordingly, the issues explored below will roughly mirror those set
out in Part III. Thereafter, pragmatic limitations for enforcing such
agreements are discussed as possibilities to cure legitimate concerns
regarding possible undue burdens on the district courts.
A. Critiquing the Bowen Decision
The Tenth Circuit's criticism of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' use
of Supreme Court precedent was untenable. In Bowen, the court
stated, "Although the Court has emphasized that parties may
'specify by contract the rules under which ... arbitration will be
conducted,' it has never said parties are free to interfere with the
judicial process.""..2 However, at least some interference with the
judicial process was allowed by the Supreme Court in Volt itself. In
Volt, the parties agreed to a state rule of arbitration" 3 that directed
the federal court to delay arbitration pending the resolution of related
litigation.' The Supreme Court permitted this agreement despite
the FAA rule allowing a party to "petition any United States district
court ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
109. Id. at 935-36.
110. Id. at 936 (citing Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of
Judicial Review ofArbitralAwards, 8 An. Rev. Int'l Arb. 147, 151-52 (1997)).
111. While the Tenth Circuit noted the Seventh Circuit's statement that parties
may not contract for expanded judicial review because "federal jurisdiction cannot
be created by contract," Chicago Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1505, the
Tenth Circuit stated that they need not decide this issue since their opinion rests on
the premise that "parties may not interfere with the judicial process by dictating how
the federal courts operate." Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 n.8. Therefore, the issue of
jurisdiction will not be discussed in this note. For an in depth discussion on this
issue, see Rau, supra note 80, at 227-30.
112. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479, 109 S.Ct. at 1248
(citation omitted)).
113. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2(c).
114. Volt, 489U.S. at471, 109 S.Ct. at 1251.
2003] NOTES 475
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
manner provided for in such agreement."'"5 Allowing the parties to
dictate contractually when the federal district court must compel
arbitration is arguably allowing parties to "interfere with the judicial
process," although perhaps to a lesser degree than expanded review.
Thus, it is questionable whether interference with the judicial process
should be used to distinguish parties who contractually alter judicial
review from Volt.
The Tenth Circuit also sought to distinguish Bowen from Volt by
the differences in the language between Section 4 and Section 10 of
the FAA. Recall that Section 4 contained the clause "in the manner
provided for in such agreement" whereas Section 10 did not.
However, the statutory language of Section 4 is not necessary to
upholding expanded review clauses. The Supreme Court explicitly
stated in Volt that "[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration
under a certain set of procedural rules""' and that parties may agree to
arbitrate "under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself."' 7
Assuming that such statutory language is necessary to the outcome
of the Bowen case, the Tenth Circuit was incorrect in assuming that
Section 4 is not applicable here. It is true that Section 10 does not
include the language "in the manner provided for in such agreement,"
as Section 4 does. However, once one recognizes that clauses
purporting to expand judicial review are not severable from the
agreement to arbitrate, it follows that the issue of expanded review
falls under Section 4 of the FAA as well as under Section 10. The
following explanation ties up this logic.
Expanded review clauses are not severable from the agreement to
arbitrate because once parties include those clauses as part of their
arbitration provisions, they then expect and rely on the protection of
substantive review that is not otherwise provided for in the FAA. In
essence, parties agree upon arbitration contingent upon expanded
review because of their fear of the possibility of aberrant awards.
Furthermore, waiving the right to seek judicial adjudication should not
be taken lightly. Recognition and protection of legal rights by way of
adjudication is no doubt highly regarded in our legal system.
Therefore, but for the agreed upon expanded standard of review, the
parties probably would not have agreed to arbitration. As a result,
expanded review clauses should be viewed as non-severable, and
should a court decide to strike down such a clause, it should strike the
entire arbitration provision.
So what does severability have to do with Section 4 of the FAA?
When a party moves to compel arbitration under Section 4, the court
115. 9 U.S.C. § 4(1999).
116. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476, 109 S.Ct. at 1254.
117. See supra note 52, and the accompanying text.
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must consider whether to grant "an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement."" The "manner" in which the parties agree to arbitrate
includes the non-severable expanded standard of review. Thus it is
necessary at that point for the court to decide the issue of expanded
review. Assuming non-severability, there would be no arbitration to
compel if the expanded review clause is struck down. This places
the issue of expanded review directly under Section 4 of the FAA
and Volt. Because Section 4 is applicable to the issue of
contractually expanded judicial review, the differences between the
language of Section 4 and Section 10 are irrelevant.
After emphasizing Volt's statement that the Court "[gave] effect
to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties without doing
violence to the policies behind ... the FAA," 9 the Tenth Circuit
accurately framed the primary issue as whether the rule established
by the parties conflicted with FAA policy. ° However, the court
missed the mark by failing to realize the significance of what the
court themselves described as the "essentially contractual nature of
arbitration."'' The Tenth Circuit contended that:
[t]he FAA's limited review ensures judicial respect for the
arbitration process and prevents courts from enforcing
parties' agreements to arbitrate only to refuse to respect the
results of the arbitration. These limited standards manifest
a legislative intent to further the federal policy favoring
arbitration by preserving the independence of the arbitration
process.
22
However, as explained in Part II A, Congress' intent, when
enacting the FAA, was to ensure that parties got what they bargained
for. In doing so, Congress emphatically recognized the contractual
nature of arbitration described above. At the time the FAA was
enacted, parties wanted extremely rigorous standards of review in
order to assure the finality they contemplated. It was precisely
because Congress recognized that parties normally intended finality
in their arbitration awards that Congress codified the limited
standards set out in Section 10 of the FAA. Had Congress found
that most parties wanted review based on questions of law and fact,
it is likely that Congress would have codified those standards in the
FAA. Therefore, to the extent that parties agree to a different
118. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1999) (emphasis added).
119. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479, 109 S.Ct. at 1248).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 934.
122. Id. at 935.
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standard, legislative intent demands that Section 10 take a backseat
to the parties' intentions. The provisions of Section 10 should be
viewed as "no more than a set of 'default rules." 1
23
To put it another way, parties contract to arbitrate, but only to the
extent of their agreement. Arbitration is a contractually created
middle-ground in the wide spectrum of dispute resolution. On one
end of the spectrum, parties that would otherwise arbitrate under the
FAA have an undisputed right to litigate their case in federal district
court "'24 and take full advantage of the court's resources and
authority. On the other hand, parties may agree to a settlement that
does away with almost all formal involvement of the court 25 and
provides the parties with any resolution they wish within the
confines of public policy. Mediation 2 6 and arbitration are other
forms of dispute resolution somewhere in the middle of the
spectrum. In all of the above instances the parties simply agree to a
level of court involvement they deem preferable.
Hence, arbitration is nothing more than a bundle of benefits and
sacrifices agreed to by parties. Some portion of the benefits of
arbitration, such as cost-effectiveness and swiftness of dispute
resolution, may be lost to expanded judicial review. However, other
benefits remain, such as control over the process, selection of the
arbitrator(s), creation of their own discovery process, heightened
privacy, and a procedural informality. Furthermore, effectiveness
and swiftness will not always be sacrificed in exchange for expanded
judicial review. "The combined process of arbitration and appeal
can be quicker and less expensive than a full-blown trial, particularly
where appeals are allowed only on questions of law. 1 27 At any rate,
it is the parties' bontractual prerogative to forego certain benefits of
arbitration in lieu of others, and the parties' intentions should be
upheld. 2 '
Allowing parties to alter the standard of judicial review would
also benefit the judiciary. One of the purposes of the FAA was to
123. Rau, supra note 80, at 231.
124. This is because the parties must have independent subject matter
jurisdiction. See supra note 8.
125. The only involvement of the court concerning settlements is when the court
enforces their settlement.
126. Mediation is defined as the "[p]rivate, informal dispute resolution process
in which a neutral third person, the mediator, helps disputing parties to reach an
agreement. The mediator has no power to impose a decision on the parties."
Black's Law Dictionary 678 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991).
127. Younger, supra note 11, at 262.
128. See Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997 ("Prudent or not, the contract expressly and
unambigously provides for review of 'errors of law;' to interpret this phrase short
of de novo review would render the language meaningless and would frustrate the
mutual intent of the parties.").
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relieve courts of a burdensome docket.129 In Volt, the Supreme Court
suggested that agreements to rules that "encourage resort to the
arbitral process" should be encouraged. 30 As admitted by the court
in Bowen, "[e]ven under expanded standards of review, arbitration
reduces the burden on district courts."'' The courts would likely
expend less time and fewer resources when reviewing arbitration
awards as opposed to trying cases. Moreover, concern for judicial
costs has recently become a significant issue since fear of aberrant
awards is becoming more prevalent, and is prompting parties to
seriously consider litigation in lieu of arbitration. 32 If contractual
expansion of judicial review is not allowed, it is likely that more
parties will forego arbitration and opt for adjudication, causing a
larger workload on the courts. Furthermore, federal district courts
are already equipped to perform as a review body since they already
act as a reviewing body in other circumstances. For example, federal
district courts frequently review bankruptcy'33 and administrative
decisions. 134
Moreover, the legal system as a whole could benefit from
allowing expanded review under the FAA. When arbitration is used
widely, with no written opinions and under very limited review, the
legal system may suffer. For instance, less case law is developed,
which is particularly troublesome if one area of the law is almost
exclusively arbitrated in lieu of litigation. Less case law hinders the
ability to understand the law. As a result, predicting outcomes in
order for people and businesses to tailor their behavior accordingly
becomes more difficult. Court opinions in certain expanded review
proceedings could increase certainty in the law. Greater judicial
review would also ensure that the law is applied correctly, which is
perhaps the most fundamental goal of the legal system. In short,
allowing expanded review could benefit the legal system by helping
to develop jurisprudence and ensuring that the law is applied
correctly.
The most puzzling and inconsistent aspect of Bowen was the
court's implementation of the judicially crafted "manifest disregard
129. Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179(11 th Cir. 1981)
("The purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act was to relieve congestion in the courts
and to provide parties with an alternative method for dispute resolution that would
be speedier and less costly than litigation.").
130. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476, 109 S.Ct. at 1254.
131. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 n.6. See also FICAL, 584 F. Supp. at 244.
132. See Younger, supra note 11, at 248 (citing Simon, supra note 18, at 571,
Sturtz, supra note 18, at S-6).
133. 28 U.S.C. §158 (1996).
134. 5 U.S.C. §§701-706 (1996).
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of the law" standard of review.'35 It is certainly inconsistent to hold
that parties may not voluntarily agree to an expanded standard of
review because it violates FAA policy, while at the same time
adopting a judicially created expanded standard of review. 36 If the
Tenth Circuit believed that expanding judicial review violates FAA
policy, then they should not have endorsed an expanded review
simply because it was judicially created.
Indeed, considering the contractual nature of arbitration, a
judicially created expanded standard of review is much more likely
to violate the FAA policy of enforcing arbitration according to the
terms of parties' agreements than a contractually expanded standard.
When parties agree to ajudicial review expansion clause, they know
what to expect in terms of review: both the FAA's standards and
their agreed upon expanded standard. Similarly, when parties agree
to submit their dispute to arbitration absent a judicial review
expansion clause, they should know what they are getting
themselves into: the possibility of vacation under the enumerated
FAA standards only. But, when courts invent standards that the
parties did not contemplate or agree to, the parties' intent, as well as
FAA policy, is frustrated.
The Tenth Circuit also suggested that "if parties desire broader
appellate review, 'they can contract for an appellate arbitration panel
to review the arbitrator's award." 37 To be sure, there is something
to be said of any type of appellate review. However, the perceived
risk of poor decision making on the part of arbitrators likely prompts
135. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932 ("Requiring more than error or misunderstanding
of the law, a finding of manifest disregard means the record will show the
arbitrators knew the law and explicitly disregarded it.") (citations omitted). The
"manifest disregard" rule was originally expanded from dictum in Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427, 436, 74 S.Ct. 182, 187 (1953).
136. The "manifest disregard of the law" standard is indeed an expanded
standard of review to the extent that it is different from, and therefore adds to the
FAA's standards. There is a possibility that this manifest disregard standard may
be viewed as a mere lesser and included articulation of one of the standards listed
in the FAA. As one scholar recently stated, "The 'manifest disregard' of the law
standard is legitimate only if viewed as arising under the [S]ection 10(a)(3)
arbitrator misconduct/misbehavior ground for vacatur." Stephen L. Hayford, Law
in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards,
30 Ga. L. Rev. 731,839 (1996). However, the Tenth Circuit stated, "[A] court may
grant a motion to vacate an arbitration award only in the limited circumstances
provided in § 10 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10, or in accordance with a few judicially
created exceptions." Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
As the "or" here is disjunctive, this statement clearly indicates that the Tenth
Circuit treated this standard as a standard different than and separate from the
FAA's standards; in essence, an expanded standard.
137. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 (citing Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago
Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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the parties to contractually expand judicial review in the first place. 31
Who makes the final decision may be more important to the parties
rather than how many decide. Adding another level of arbitrators that
some parties perceive as possible poor decision makers may not
alleviate the parties' concern. The parties may be worried that the
appellate arbitrators will allow the same aberrant awards that the initial
arbitrators allowed. Furthermore, there is little difference between
adding appellate arbitrators and expanding the already existing panel,
since both methods merely expose the case to more arbitrators with the
hopes of yielding a fair decision. In the end, this option does not
appear to be a viable alternative to alleviate what parties perceive as
the problem.
The Tenth Circuit also reasoned that expanded judicial review will
"reduce... arbitrators' willingness to create particularized solutions
for fear the decision will be vacated by a reviewing court."' 39 Of
course, this speculation is yet to be proven. Even assuming a risk of
decrease in "particularized solutions," expanded review would likely
encourage better reasoning from the arbitrator since the arbitrator
would have to render a written opinion explaining his or her reasoning
in anticipation ofjudicial review."4° This approach would encourage
the correct application of law and produce fairer results. Furthermore,
it should be the parties' prerogative to take the risk that creative
solutions will decrease. Parties may be aware of this theory and may
consciously forego such a risk in exchange for expanded review.'4'
B. Possible Limitations
Allowing parties to contractually expand judicial standards of
review in arbitration proceedings does not mean that there should be
no limit to their agreement. In order to make expanded review
feasible and to avoid overburdening the district courts, at least some
pragmatic requirements must be met before courts honor agreements
for expanded review. The following concerns are not intended to be
exclusive, as the prediction of all problematic agreements is not
possible. These concerns are set forth merely to demonstrate that
contractually expanded review is not wholly without limits.
138. See Younger, supra note 11, at 248 (citing Simon, supra note 18, at 571
and Sturtz, supra note 18, at S-6)).
139. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 (citing Hans Smit, ContractualModification ofthe
Scope of Judicial Review ofArbitral Awards, 8 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 147, 151-52
(1997)).
140. See infra Part IV(B).
141. For the astute readers who are keeping up with the author's mirrored
approach to analyzing Bowen, the Tenth Circuit's argument concerning district
courts' potential exposure to unfamiliar rules will be addressed infra Part IV(B).
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One rather conspicuous limitation is the requirement of a written
opinion by the arbitrator(s), as well as a transcript of the arbitration
proceedings. Currently, the FAA does not require a written
explanation on the part of the arbitrator14 or a transcript of the
arbitration proceedings. This makes it nearly impossible to apply
even the FAA's extremely limited standards of review, much less
more stringent standards of review. 43 Consequently, effective
review cannot be implemented unless there is a written opinion and
transcript.
Another concern, as noted in Bowen,"' relates to the agreed-
upon standard of review itself. Noting this issue, Judge Kozinski
pointed out in his concurrence in Lapine: "I would call the case
differently if the agreement provided that the district judge would
review the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead
fowl.' 45 Although these scenarios are unlikely, it is conceivable for
parties to agree to invented standards of review that are unfamiliar
to the court and, hence, more difficult to implement. For example,
if parties contractually created an extremely complex and unfamiliar
set of evidence, discovery, and procedural rules, and then provided
that the district court would review the entire record to determine if
those rules were violated, then perhaps this would be too
burdensome for the court. However, judging from the language
purporting to expand review in the cases discussed in Part II B, this
does not seem likely to be a problem. All of these cases merely
provide for review based on errors of law and errors of
fact-standards that may be easily applied by federal judges.
Nevertheless, parties should agree to a familiar legal standard that
courts are readily equipped to implement. Such a familiar standard
would help the parties assure an accurate interpretation by the
federal courts of their intent.
V. CONCLUSION
Bowen v. Amoco created a split in the circuits that must be
resolved. Parties must be able to predict whether judicial review
expansion clauses will be enforced in order to shape their
agreements according to their wishes. To eliminate this confusion,
there must be consistency in the circuits.
142. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361 (1960).
143. Hayford & Peeples, supra note 6, at 360 (stating that "without a written
award, substantive review is next to impossible").
144. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
145. Lapine, 130 F.3d at 891 (Judge Kozinski concurring).
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Arbitration is essentially a contractual arrangement of dispute
resolution that must be honored according to its terms, including
agreements to expanded review. Congress drafted the FAA with the
aim of facilitating contractual intent as to the finality of arbitration
awards, while relieving federal courts of a burdensome docket.
Allowing contractual expanded review would allow parties to reap
many benefits of arbitration while securing outcomes closer to their
expectations. In short, Supreme Court precedent, FAA policy, and
the practical benefits of expanded review all point in the direction of
allowing parties to contractually expand judicial review under the
FAA.
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